Organisation and Work of the People at BletchleyPark Essay -- Papers

Organisation and Work of the People at BletchleyPark In 1938, Chief of M.I.6; Admiral Sinclair purchased, at his own expense, the house that would later be converted into Bletchley Park. At the beginning of the war, Station X had two main goals. The first was to decode the signals sent by the Germans using simple encryption which were easily cracked. The second goal was the mission of cracking the Enigma coding system which the Germans used to send the more vital messages. The first arrivals of Station X were split into two categories; the first were the code breakers, mainly the academic group, which previously helped break codes. The second was the administrative team, which were mostly young girls in their late teens and/or early twenties. The first arrivals were soon joined by the mathematicians. At first, all the departments of Station X were crammed into the main house and some cottages. In September 1939, a wooden extension to the main house was constructed and was called Hut 4, which was later expanded to Hut 8. This housed the Naval section, which were at the time working on decoding non-Enigma messages, however, at the time of the expansion to Hut 8, the Naval section were starting to work on Enigma codes too. By the beginning of 1940, Station X was based around two huts. Hut 6 which would decode the messages then send them to Hut 3 which would translate the messages. When decoding in Hut 6 was finished, the messages were then sent to Hut 3, usually made no sense. Welchman had a system of processes in place within Hut 3, which would decode the Enigma messages when they were able to. Other Huts such as Hut 1 and .. ... Out of all the operations in Europe, none of them need more accurate information than D-Day. In May 1944, Station X discovered that the Germans were expecting a landing in Normandy, but expected that this would be a diversion to the main attack in Calais. Station X managed to find this out and the Allies then manage to adapt their plans. D-Day was originally planned for 4 June 1944 but was delayed due to bad weather conditions until 6 June. Station X was an invaluable source of information about the enemy forces for the last four years of the war. The Allied Commanders still had to achieve the victory, but they used the information that Station X submitted to aid them in their planning. Without the help of Station X, victory would not have been achieved as quickly as it did or may not have been achieved at all.

Dreams, Hopes and Life Expectation of the Korean Immigrants: Past and Present Essay

At the beginning of the 21st century, America is filled with millions of immigrants coming from all over the world. Immigrants dream about good life and good education, prosperity and even good friends. Many Korean immigrants dream about social stability and prosperity, well-paid job and social security. Immigration to America allows Koreans to be better positioned in the world and give them a chance to survive and prosper in different environments. Thesis Half a century ago, Korean immigrants came to America dreaming about material success and job opportunities, while today they dream about good education and human rights protection. At the beginning of the 20th century, there was a great gap between economic and political development of Korea and the USA. Korean immigrants came to America dreaming about their own house and a car, good healthcare services and good food. During the middle of the century, new production in America became customer oriented, and tried to meet the needs of a particular groups of customers. Similar to The Rogarshevskys or the Confino’s, many Korean immigrants coming to America supposed that through persistence, hard work and determination they could achieve high social status in the foreign land. These dreams were caused by economic instability and low social position affected Korea. Poverty in Korea was one of the main problems faced by the population. In the USA, Koreans dreamt about good healthcare and dental care. In Korea, political instability and totalitarian regime limited freedoms and rights of the citizens. These factors influenced dreams and expectations of the immigrants hoping for better life and government protection. Also, high rates of unemployment in Korea were more likely to be seen as a social problem than was poverty. In America, Koreans dreamt about their own businesses protected by laws and regulations. For instance, â€Å"millions of start-ups began in the past 20 years during a record economic expansion. But the number of minority-owned companies is growing 17% a year — twice the rate of all companies† (Hopkins 2002). In Korea, the human capital assumed that the inadequate incomes of the working poor were the result of characteristics of the labor market rather than the inadequacy of the poor. In America, Korean immigrants dreamt that working hard for many years they could earn for living and could send some money to their relatives in Korea (Lower east Side Tournament Museum 2007). Today, Korean immigrants come to America dreaming about great opportunities for personal development, social security, government protection, social freedoms and high paid job. For many immigrants, the American dream coincides with humans’ rights, equal opportunities and freedom. Many foreign students suppose that education in the USA opens new opportunities for immigrants helping them to â€Å"become equal† to native citizens and obtain professional skills. â€Å"But the higher level of education clearly gives Asians a leg up in the United States† (Hopkins 2002). Even today, Korean immigrants are satisfied with low paid jobs looking for government protection and support. According to statistical results, â€Å"Korean students comprise 10.4 percent of all international students in the USA. Smith revealed that the Korean government has plans to implement various reforms, including revising the college admission system starting in 2008† (Ten Percent Increase in Korean Students Studying 2007). In this very case, the dream about ‘good education’ is therefore a key element of improved intellectual potential and future career success. Another dream of Korean immigrants is a desire to achieve high social position and fair compensation for their job. From the social point, knowledge and career opportunities give the feeling of personal freedom and mobility so desirable for Koreans. Korean immigrants dream about freedom of choice and freedom of speech. To some extent, knowledge and stable social position embodies personal democracy (Ten Percent Increase in Korean Students Studying 2007). For instance, democracy and absence of physical oppression has allowed creativity and entrepreneurship to flourish. Also, career opportunities mean that everything is possible if you are energetic person who is driven by success. This dream coincides with the slogan of Independence. Although, the main features of ‘the Korean dream’ is the great faith in personal courage that help to realize dreams. In sum, the dreams of Korean immigrants have changed over time influenced by economic and social changes n Korea and new opportunities opened in the USA. Thus, a dream about stable social posit6ion and fair compensation, equal and democratic rights, good education and professional development are still vital. In America, knowledge gives total freedom and guarantees complete control over life. For Korean immigrants, education means absence of restrictions and compulsions, and in correlation with the idea of will, it is the opportunity to act as would be desirable. The immigration to America gives Koreans a chance and hope to change their life. In contrast to the previous age, modern immigration deals with psychological and social factors rather than political or economic. Works Cited 1. Hopkins, J. Asian business owners gaining clout. USA TODAY. 2002. 25 October 2007. 2. Lower east Side Tenement Museum. 2007. 25 October 2007. 3. Ten Percent Increase in Korean Students Studying in the USA. 2007. 25 October 2007.

Small Business, Innovation, and Public Policy in the Information Technology Industry

New firms have played a major role in fomenting innovation in information technology. A recent study by Greenwood and Jovanovic [1999] provide one dramatic illustration of these trends. These authors show that a group of â€Å"IT upstarts†Ã¢â‚¬â€firms specializing in computer and communications technologies that went public after 1968—now account for over 4% of the total U. S. equity market capitalization. While some of this growth has come at the expense of incumbent information technology firms, the new market value and technological spillovers created by these new businesses appear to be substantial. The role of new firms in the information technology industries has rekindled interest in the relationship between firm characteristics and innovation. Are small businesses more innovative in general? Are high-technology start-ups particularly important? If the answer to either of these questions is yes, how should policymakers seek to encourage these firms? The relationship between innovation and firm characteristics has been one of the most researched topics in the empirical industrial organization literature. To summarize these discussions and draw some implications for policymakers in a few pages is thus a daunting challenge! Consequently, this essay takes a quite selective approach to these issues. First, I very briefly summarize the academic literature on the relationship between firm size and innovation. This work suggests that there appears to be a very weak relationship between firm size, the tendency to undertake R&D, and the effectiveness of research spending. Small businesses, in aggregate, do not appear to be particularly research-intensive or innovative. I then turn to examining one subset of small businesses that do appear to excel at innovation: venture capital-backed start-ups. I highlight some of the venture-backed firms’ contributions. I also discuss why the success of such firms is not accidental. In particular, I highlight the key problems that the financing of small innovative companies pose, as well as some of the key mechanisms that venture investors employ to guide the innovation process. It is not surprising, then, that venture capital investments are concentrated in information technology industries, and that they appear to pur innovation. Finally, I consider one set of policy issues related to small firms and innovation. In particular, I discuss some recent changes in the intellectual property protection system that appear to favor larger firms. I then argue that this may be an area that would reward increased attention by policy-makers interested in helping innovative small businesses in information technology a nd other high-technology industries. 1. Small Business and Innovation A substantial but largely inconclusive literature examines the relationship between firm size and innovation. These studies have been handicapped by the difficulty of measuring innovative inputs and outputs, as well as the challenges of creating a sample that is free of selection biases and other estimation problems. While a detailed review of this literature is beyond the scope of this piece, the interested reader can turn to surveys by Baldwin and Scott [1987] and Cohen and Levin [1989]. Much of the work in this literature has sought to relate measures of innovative discoveries—whether R&D expenditures, patents, inventions, or other measures—to firm size. Initial studies were undertaken using the largest manufacturing firms; more recent works have employed larger samples and more disaggregated data (e. g. , studies employing data on firms’ specific lines of business). Despite the improved methodology of recent studies, the results have remained inconclusive: even when a significant relationship between firm size and innovation has been found, it has had little economic significance. For instance, Cohen, Levin, and Mowery [1987] concluded that a doubling of firm size only increased the ratio of R&D to sales by 0. 2%. One of the relatively few empirical regularities emerging from studies of technological innovation is the critical role played by small firms and new entrants in certain industries. The role of entrants—typically de novo start-ups—in emerging industries was highlighted, for instance, in the pioneering case study-based research of Jewkes, Sawers, and Stillerman [1958]. Acs and Audretsch [1988] examined this question more systematically. They documented that the contribution of small firms to innovation was a function of industry conditions: the contribution was greatest in immature industries which were relatively unconcentrated. These findings suggested that entrepreneurs and small firms often played a key role in observing where new technologies could be applied to meet customer needs, and rapidly introducing products. These patterns are also predicted in several models of technological competition, many of which were reviewed in Reinganum [1989], as well in several analyses in the organizational behavior literature [several were discussed in Henderson, 1993]. The 1990s have seen several dramatic illustrations of these patterns. Two potentially revolutionary areas of technological innovation—biotechnology and the Internet—were pioneered by smaller entrants. Neither established drug companies nor mainframe computer manufacturers were pioneers in developing these technologies. By and large, small firms did not invent the key genetic engineering techniques or Internet protocols. Rather, the bulk of the enabling technologies were developed with Federal funds at academic institutions and research laboratories. It was the small entrants, however, who were the first to seize upon the commercial opportunities. 2. Venture Capital and Innovation One set of small firms, however, appear to have had a disproportionate effect on innovation: those backed by venture capitalists. Venture capital can be defined as equity or equity-linked investments in young, privately held companies, where the investor is a financial intermediary is typically actively as a director, advisor or even manager of the firm. ) While venture capitalists fund only a few hundred of the nearly one million businesses begun in the United States each year, these firms have a disprop ortionate impact on technological innovation. This claim is supported by a variety of evidence. One measure, while crude, is provided by the firms which â€Å"graduate† to the public marketplace. In the past two decades, about one-third of the companies going public (weighted by value) have been backed by venture investors. A second way to assess these claims is to examine which firms have been funded. Venture capitalists, while contributing a relatively modest share of the total financing, provided critical early capital and guidance to many of the new firms in such emerging industries as biotechnology, computer networking, and the Internet. In some cases, these new firms—utilizing the capital, expertise, and contacts provided by their venture capital investors—established themselves as market leaders. In other instances, they were acquired by larger corporations, or entered into licensing arrangements with such concerns. Consider, for instance, the biotechnology industry. Venture capitalists provided only a small fraction of the external financing raised in the industry, and only 450 out of 1500 firms have received venture financing through 1995. These venture-backed firms, however, accounted for over 85% of the patents awarded and drugs approved for marketing. Similarly, venture capitalists have aggressively backed firms in information technology industries, which accounted for 60% of all venture disbursements in 1998. These have included many of the most successful firms in the industry, including Amazon. com, Cisco Systems, Microsoft, Intel, and Yahoo. A final way to assess the impact of the venture industry is to consider the impact of venture backed firms. Survey results suggest that these investments have powerful impacts. For instance, a mid-1996 survey by the venture organization Kleiner, Perkins, Caufield, and Byers found that the firms that the partnership had financed since its inception in 1971 had created 131,000 jobs, generated $44 billion in annual revenues, and had $84 billion in market capitalization [Peltz, 1996]. While Kleiner, Perkins is one of the most successful venture capital groups, the results are suggestive of the impact of the industry. More systematically, Kortum and Lerner [1998] examining the influence of venture capital on patented inventions in the United States across twenty industries over three decades. They address concerns about causality in several ways, including exploiting a 1979 policy shift that spurred venture capital fundraising. They find that the amount of venture capital activity in an industry significantly increases its rate of patenting. While the ratio of venture capital to R&D has averaged less than 3% in recent years, the estimates suggest that venture capital accounts for about 15% of industrial innovations. They address concerns that these results are an artifact of the use of patent counts by demonstrating similar patterns when other measures of innovation are used in a sample of 530 venture-backed and non-venture-backed firms. Lending particular relevance to an examination of these firms is the tremendous boom in the U. S. venture capital industry in recent years. The pool of venture partnerships has grown ten-fold, from under $4 billion in 1978 to about $75 billion at the end of 1998. Venture capital’s recent growth has outstripped that of almost every class of financial product. It is worth underscoring that the tremendous success of venture-backed firms has not happened by accident. The interactions between venture capitalists and the entrepreneurs that they finance are often complex. They can be understood, however, as a response to the challenges that the financing of emerging growth companies pose. Entrepreneurs rarely have the capital to see their ideas to fruition and must rely on outside financiers. Meanwhile, those who control capital—for instance, pension fund trustees and university overseers—are unlikely to have the time or expertise to invest directly in young or restructuring firms. Some entrepreneurs might turn to other financing sources, such as bank loans or the issuance of public stock, to meet their needs. But because of four key factors, some of the most potentially profitable and exciting firms would be unable to access financing if venture capital did not exist. The first factor, uncertainty, is a measure of the array of potential outcomes for a company or project. The wider the dispersion of potential outcomes, the greater the uncertainty. By their very nature, young companies are associated with significant levels of uncertainty. Uncertainty surrounds whether the research program or new product will succeed. The response of firm’s rivals may also be uncertain. High uncertainty means that investors and entrepreneurs cannot confidently predict what the company will look like in the future. Uncertainty affects the willingness of investors to contribute capital, the desire of suppliers to extend credit, and the decisions of a firm’s managers. If managers are averse to taking risks, it may be difficult to induce them to make the right decisions. Conversely, if entrepreneurs are overoptimistic, then investors want to curtail various actions. Uncertainty also affects the timing of investment. Should an investor contribute all the capital at the beginning, or should he stage the investment through time? Investors need to know how information-gathering activities can address these concerns and when they should be undertaken. The second factor, asymmetric information (or information disparities), is distinct from uncertainty. Because of his day-to-day involvement with the firm, an entrepreneur knows more about his company’s prospects than investors, suppliers, or strategic partners. Various problems develop in settings where asymmetric information is prevalent. For instance, the entrepreneur may take detrimental actions that investors cannot observe: perhaps undertaking a riskier strategy than initially suggested or not working as hard as the investor expects. The entrepreneur might also invest in projects that build up his reputation at the investors’ expense. Asymmetric information can also lead to selection problems. The entrepreneur may exploit the fact that he knows more about the project or his abilities than investors do. Investors may find it difficult to distinguish between competent entrepreneurs and incompetent ones. Without the ability to screen out unacceptable projects and entrepreneurs, investors are unable to make efficient and appropriate decisions. The third factor affecting a firm’s corporate and financial strategy is the nature of its assets. Firms that have tangible assets—e. g. , machines, buildings, land, or physical inventory—may find financing easier to obtain or may be able to obtain more favorable terms. The ability to abscond with the firm’s source of value is more difficult when it relies on physical assets. When the most important assets are intangible, such as trade secrets, raising outside financing from traditional sources may be more challenging. Market conditions also play a key role in determining the difficulty of financing firms. Both the capital and product markets may be subject to substantial variations. The supply of capital from public investors and the price at which this capital is available may vary dramatically. These changes may be a response to regulatory edicts or shifts in investors’ perceptions of future profitability. Similarly, the nature of product markets may vary dramatically, whether due to shifts in the intensity of competition with rivals or in the nature of the customers. If there is exceedingly intense competition or a great deal of uncertainty about the size of the potential market, firms may find it very difficult to raise capital from traditional sources. Venture capitalists have a variety of mechanisms at their disposal to address these changing factors. They will invest in stages, often at increasing valuations. Each refinancing is tied to a re-evaluation of the company and its prospects. In these financings, they will employ complex financing mechanisms, often hybrid securities like convertible preferred equity or convertible debt. These financial structures can potentially screen out overconfident or under-qualified entrepreneurs and reduce the venture capitalists’ risks. They will also shift the mixture of investors from whom a firm acquires capital. Each source—private equity investors, corporations, and the public markets—may be appropriate for a firm at different points in its life. Venture capitalists provide not only introductions to these other sources of capital but certification—a â€Å"stamp of approval† that addresses the concerns of other investors. Finally, once the investment is made, they monitor and work with the entrepreneurs to ensure that the right operational and strategic decisions are made and implemented. 3. Innovation, Small Business, and Public Policy If small firms—or even some subset of small firms—are playing an important role in the innovation process, one policy goal should be to address threats to their future development. This is particularly true of threats that have been created by misguided government policies, however good the intentions of their designers. The area that I believe deserves particular attention relates to the key mechanism for protecting intellectual property, namely patents. The U. S. patent system has undergone a profound shift over the past fifteen years. The strength of patent protection has been dramatically bolstered, and both large and small firms are devoting considerably more effort to seeking patent protection and defending their patents in the courts. Many in the patent community—U. S. Patent and Trademark Office officials, the patent bar, and corporate patent staff—have welcomed these changes. But viewed more broadly, the reforms of the patent system and the consequent growth of patent litigation have created a substantial â€Å"innovation tax† that afflicts some of America's most important and creative small firms. Almost all formal disputes involving issued patents are tried in the Federal judicial system. The initial litigation must be undertaken in a district court. Prior to 1982, appeals of patent cases were heard in the appellate courts of the various circuits. These differed considerably in their interpretation of patent law. Because few appeals of patent cases were heard by the Supreme Court, substantial differences persisted, leading to widespread â€Å"forum shopping† by litigants. In 1982, the U. S. Congress established a centralized appellate court for patent cases, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC). As Robert Merges [1992] observes, While the CAFC was ostensibly formed strictly to unify patent doctrine, it was no doubt hoped by some (and expected by others) that the new court would make subtle alterations in the doctrinal fabric, with an eye to enhancing the patent system. To judge by results, that is exactly what happened. The CAFC's rulings have been more â€Å"pro-patent† than the previous courts. For instance, the circuit courts had affirmed 62% of district court findings of patent infringement in the three decades prior to the creation of the CAFC, while the CAFC in its first eight years affirmed 90% of such decisions [Koenig, 1980; Harmon, 1991]. The strengthening of patent law has not gone unnoticed by corporations. Over the past decade, patents awarded to U. S. corporations have increased by 50%. Furthermore, the willingness of firms to litigate patents has increased considerably. The number of patent suits instituted in the Federal courts has increased from 795 in 1981 to 1553 in 1993; adversarial proceedings within the U. S. Patent and Trademark Office have increased from 246 in 1980 to 684 in 1992 [Administrative Office, various years; U. S. Department of Commerce, various years]. My recent analysis of litigation by firms based in Middlesex County, Massachusetts suggests that six intellectual property-related suits are filed for every one hundred patent awards to corporations. These suits lead to significant expenditures by firms. Based on historical costs, I estimate that patent litigation begun in 1991 will lead to total legal expenditures (in 1991 dollars) of over $1 billion, a substantial amount relative to the $3. billion spent by U. S. firms on basic research in 1991. [These findings are summarized in Lerner, 1995. ] Litigation also leads to substantial indirect costs. The discovery process is likely to require the alleged infringer to produce extensive documentation, time-consuming depositions from employees, and may generate unfavorable publicity. Its officers and directors may also be held i ndividually liable. As firms have realized the value of their patent positions, they have begun reviewing their stockpiles of issued patents. Several companies, including Texas Instruments, Intel, Wang Laboratories, and Digital Equipment, have established groups that approach rivals to demand royalties on old patent awards. In many cases, they have been successful in extracting license agreements and/or past royalties. For instance, Texas Instruments is estimated to have netted $257 million in 1991 from patent licenses and settlements resulting from their general counsel's aggressive enforcement policy [Rosen, 1992]. Particularly striking, practitioner accounts suggest, has been the growth of litigation–and threats of litigation–between large and small firms. This trend is disturbing. While litigation is clearly a necessary mechanism to defend property rights, the proliferation of such suits may be leading to transfers of financial resources from some of the youngest and most innovative firms to more established, better capitalized concerns. Even if the target firm feels that it does not infringe, it may choose to settle rather than fight. It either may be unable to raise the capital to finance a protracted court battle, or else may believe that the publicity associated with the litigation will depress the valuation of its equity. In addition, these small firms may reduce or alter their investment in R. For instance, a 1990 survey of 376 firms found that the time and expense of intellectual property litigation was a major factor in the decision to pursue an innovation for almost twice as many firms with under 500 employees than for larger businesses [Koen, 1990]. These claims are also supported by my study [1995] of the patenting behavior of new biotechnology firms that have different litigation costs. I showed that firms with high litigation costs are less likely to patent in subclasses with many other awards, particularly those of firms with low litigation costs. These effects have been particularly pernicious in emerging industries. Chronically strained for resources, USPTO officials are unlikely to assign many patent examiners to emerging technologies in advance of a wave of applications. As patent applications begin flowing in, the USPTO frequently finds the retention of the few examiners skilled in the new technologies difficult. Companies are likely to hire away all but the least able examiners. These examiners are valuable not only for their knowledge of the USPTO examination procedure in the new technology, but also for their understanding of what other patent applications are in process but not awarded. (U. S. patent applications are held confidential until time of award. ) Many of the examinations in emerging technologies are as a result performed under severe time pressures by inexperienced examiners. Consequently, awards of patents in several critical new technologies have been delayed and highly inconsistent. These ambiguities have created ample opportunities for firms that seek to aggressively litigate their patent awards. The clearest examples of this problem are the biotechnology and software industries. In the latter industry, examples abound where inexperienced examiners have granted patents on technologies that were widely diffused but not previously patented [see, for instance, the many examples chronicled in Aharonian, 1999]. It might be asked why policy-makers have not addressed the deleterious effects of patent policy changes. The difficulties that Federal officials have faced in reforming the patent system are perhaps best illustrated by the efforts to simplify one of the most arcane aspects of our patent system, the â€Å"first-to-invent† policy. With the exception of the Philippines and Jordan, all other nations award patents to firms that are the first to file for patent protection. The U. S. , however, has clung to the first-to-invent system. In the U. S. , a patent will be awarded to the party who can demonstrate (through laboratory notebooks and other evidence) that he was the initial discoverer of a new invention, even if he did not file for patent protection until after others did (within certain limits). A frequently invoked argument for the first-to-invent system is that this provides protection for small inventors, who may take longer to translate a discovery into a completed patent application. While this argument is initially compelling, the reality is quite different. Disputes over priority of invention are resolved through a proceeding before the USPTO's Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences known as an interference. The Board will hold a hearing to determine which inventor first made the discovery. The interference process has been characterized as â€Å"an archaic procedure, replete with traps for the unwary† [Calvert, 1980]. These interferences consume a considerable amount of resources: the adjudication of the average interference is estimated to cost over one hundred thousand dollars [Kingston, 1992]. Yet in recent years, in only about 55 cases annually has the party that was second-to-file been determined to have been the first-to-invent [Calvert and Sofocleous, 1992]. Thus, the U. S. persists in this complex, costly, and idiosyncratic system in order to reverse the priority of 0. 3% of the patent applications filed each year. But this system has proved very resistant to change. At least since 1967, proposals have been unsuccessfully offered to shift the U. S. to a first-to-file system. As recently as January 1994, USPTO Commissioner Bruce Lehman was forced to withdraw such a proposal. While the voices raised in protest over his initiative—as those opposing e arlier reform attempts—were led by advocates for small inventors, it is difficult not to conclude that the greatest beneficiary from the first-to-file system is the small subset of the patent bar that specializes in interference law. It may be thought puzzling that independent inventors, who are generally unable to afford costly litigation, have been so active in supporting the retention of â€Å"first-to-invest. † A frequently voiced complaint is that small inventors take longer to prepare patent applications, and hence would lose out to better-financed rivals, in a â€Å"first-to-file† world. This argument appears to be specious for several reasons. First, economically important discoveries are typically the subject of patent filings in a number of countries. Thus, there is already an enormous pressure to file quickly. Second, the recent reforms of the U. S. system have created a new provisional patent application, which is much simpler to file than a full-fledged application. Finally, as former Commissioner Lehman notes, many most vocal independent inventors opposing patent reform are â€Å"weekend hobbyists . . . [rather than representatives of] knowledge-based industries† [Chartrand, 1995]. As this case study suggests, the failure of Federal reform efforts is due to several factors. First, the issues are complex, and sometimes difficult to understand. Simplistic claims frequently cloud these discussions. For instance, because firms use patents to protect innovations, it is frequently argued that a stronger patent system will lead to more innovation. Second, the people with the greatest economic stake in retaining a litigious and complex patent system—the patent bar—have proven to be a very powerful lobby. The efforts of the highly specialized interference bar to retain â€Å"first to invent† is a prime example. Finally, the top executives of technology-intensive firms have not mounted an effective campaign around these issues. The reason may be that the companies who are most adversely affected are small, capital-constrained firms who do not have time for major lobbying efforts. Thus, an important policy concern is that we avoid taking steps in the name of increasing competitiveness that actually interfere with the workings of innovative small businesses. The 1982 reform of the patent litigation process appears to have had exactly this sort of unintended consequence. References Zoltan J. Acs and David B. Audretsch, â€Å"Innovation in Large and Small Firms: An Empirical Analysis,† American Economic Review, 78 (1988), pp. 78-690. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Annual Report of the Director, Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, various years. Gregory Aharonian, â€Å"Internet Patent News Service,† http://metalab. unc. edu/patents/ipnsinfo. html, 1999. William L. Baldwin and John T. Scott, Market Structure and Technological Change, Chur, Switzerland: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1987. Ian A. Calvert, â€Å"An Overview of Interference Practice,† Journal of the Patent Office Society, 62 (1980), pp. 290-308. Ian A. Calvert and Michael Sofocleous, â€Å"Interference Statistics for Fiscal Years 1989 to 1991,† Journal of the Patent and Trademark Office Society, 74 (1992), pp. 822-826. Sabra Chartrand, â€Å"Facing High-Tech Issues, New Patents Chief in Reinventing a Staid Agency,† New York Times, July 14, 1995, p. 17. Michael P. Chu, â€Å"An Antitrust Solution to the New Wave of Predatory Patent Infringement Litigation,† William and Mary Law Review, 33 (1992), pp. 1341-68. Wesley M. Cohen and Richard C. Levin, Empirical Studies of Innovation and Market Structure,† in Richard Schmalensee and Robert D. Willig, editors, Handbook of Industrial Organization, New York: North-Holland, 1989, volume II, chapter 18. Wesley M. Cohen, Richard C. Levin, and David C. Mowery, â€Å"Firm Size and R&D Intensity: A Re-Examination,† Journal of Industrial Economics, 35 (1987), pp. 543-563. Paul A. Gompers and Josh Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999. Jeremy Greenwood and Boyan Jovanovic, â€Å"The IT Revolution and the Stock Market,† American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 89 (1999) forthcoming. Robert L. Harmon, Patents and the Federal Circuit, Washington: Bureau of National Affairs, 1991. Rebecca Henderson, â€Å"Underinvestment and Incompetence as Responses to Radical Innovation: Evidence from the Photolithographic Alignment Equipment Industry,† Rand Journal of Economics, 24 (1993), pp. 248-270. Michael C. Jensen, â€Å"Presidential Address: The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems,† Journal of Finance, 48 (1993), pp. 831-880. John Jewkes, David Sawers, and Richard Stillerman, The Sources of Invention, London: St. Martins Press, 1958. William Kingston, â€Å"Is the United States Right about ‘First-to-Invent'? ,† European Intellectual Property Review, 7 (1992), pp. 23-226. Mary S. Koen, Survey of Small Business Use of Intellectual Property Protection: Report of a Survey Conducted by MO-SCI Corporation for the Small Business Administration, Rolla, Missouri: MO-SCI Corp. , 1990. Gloria K. Koenig, Patent Invalidity: A Statistical and Substantive Analysis, New York: Clark Boardman, 1980. Samuel Kortum a nd Josh Lerner, â€Å"Does Venture Capital Spur Innovation? ,† National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 6846, 1998. Josh Lerner, â€Å"Patenting in the Shadow of Competitors,† Journal of Law and Economics, 38 (1995), pp. 63-595. Josh Lerner, â€Å"Small Businesses, Innovation, and Public Policy,† in Zoltan Acs, editor, Are Small Firms Important? , New York: Kluwer Academic Publishing, 1999, forthcoming. Josh Lerner and Robert Merges, â€Å"The Control of Strategic Alliances: An Empirical Analysis of Biotechnology Collaborations,† Journal of Industrial Economics (Special Issue on â€Å"Inside the Pin Factory: Empirical Studies Augmented by Manager Interviews. †), 46 (1998), pp. 125-156. Robert P. Merges, Patent Law and Policy, Charlottesville: Michie Company, 1992. National Venture Capital Association, 1999 National Venture Capital Association Yearbook, Arlington, Virginia: National Venture Capital Association, 1999. Michael Peltz, â€Å"High Tech’s Premier Venture Capitalist,† Institutional Investor, 30 (June 1996), pp. 89-98. Jennifer R. Reinganum, â€Å"The Timing of Innovation: Research, Development and Diffusion,† in Richard Schmalensee and Robert D. Willig, editors, Handbook of Industrial Organization, New York: North-Holland, 1989, volume I, chapter 14. Miriam Rosen, â€Å"Texas Instruments' $250 Million-a-Year Profit Center,† American Lawyer, 14 (March 1992), pp. 56-63.

Free Essays on Pearl S. Buck

Pearl Buck The person in this research paper is Pearl S. Buck. She was a famous writer on books about her and what is going on around the world. She lived most of her life in China, and some in the United States. Pearl S. Buck was born in Hillsboro, West Virginia. She spent her youth in China, in Chin kiang on the Yangtze River. She learned to speak Chinese before she could speak English. Her parents were missionaries. Buck's father, Absalom Sydenstricker, was a very smart man who spent years translating the Bible from Greek to Chinese. Her mother, Caroline Stulting, had traveled widely in her youth and loved literature. Buck's life in China wasn’t very good. When she was only a child, her family was forced to flee from the rebel forces of the Boxer Rebellion.1 After being taught by her mother and a Chinese tutor, who was a Confucian scholar, Buck was sent to a boarding school in Shanghai at the age of fifteen. She also worked for the Door of Hope, a shelter for Chinese slave girls. Buck continued her education in the United States at Randolph-Macon Woman's College in Virginia, and studied psychology there. After graduating in 1914 she returned to China as a teacher for the Presbyterian Board of Missions. Her mother was very ill and Buck had to spend the next two years taking care of her. She married Dr. John Lossing Buck, an agricultural expert, who loved his work. When her mother became better, they moved into a village in the North China.2 Buck worked as a teacher and interpreter for her husband and traveled through the countryside. During this period China took steps toward liberal reform, also through the May 4th Movement of 1917 to 1921. In the 1920s the Bucks moved to Nan king, where she taught English and American literature at the university. In 1924 she returned to the United States to seek medical care for he first daughter who was mentally retarded. In 1926 she received her M.A. in literature from Cornell Univer... Free Essays on Pearl S. Buck Free Essays on Pearl S. Buck Pearl Buck The person in this research paper is Pearl S. Buck. She was a famous writer on books about her and what is going on around the world. She lived most of her life in China, and some in the United States. Pearl S. Buck was born in Hillsboro, West Virginia. She spent her youth in China, in Chin kiang on the Yangtze River. She learned to speak Chinese before she could speak English. Her parents were missionaries. Buck's father, Absalom Sydenstricker, was a very smart man who spent years translating the Bible from Greek to Chinese. Her mother, Caroline Stulting, had traveled widely in her youth and loved literature. Buck's life in China wasn’t very good. When she was only a child, her family was forced to flee from the rebel forces of the Boxer Rebellion.1 After being taught by her mother and a Chinese tutor, who was a Confucian scholar, Buck was sent to a boarding school in Shanghai at the age of fifteen. She also worked for the Door of Hope, a shelter for Chinese slave girls. Buck continued her education in the United States at Randolph-Macon Woman's College in Virginia, and studied psychology there. After graduating in 1914 she returned to China as a teacher for the Presbyterian Board of Missions. Her mother was very ill and Buck had to spend the next two years taking care of her. She married Dr. John Lossing Buck, an agricultural expert, who loved his work. When her mother became better, they moved into a village in the North China.2 Buck worked as a teacher and interpreter for her husband and traveled through the countryside. During this period China took steps toward liberal reform, also through the May 4th Movement of 1917 to 1921. In the 1920s the Bucks moved to Nan king, where she taught English and American literature at the university. In 1924 she returned to the United States to seek medical care for he first daughter who was mentally retarded. In 1926 she received her M.A. in literature from Cornell Univer...

All About Any in French

All About Any in French The English word any has numerous French translations, depending on what it means and whether it is used as an adjective, pronoun, or adverb. Any = No Matter Which adjective: nimporte quel You can have any book | Tu peux avoir nimporte quel livreAny chair will do | Nimporte quelle chaise fera laffaireIll watch any programs | Je regarde nimporte quels programmes pronoun: nimporte lequel You can have any one (of them) | Tu peux avoir nimporte lequelAny (one) will do | Nimporte laquelle fera laffaireIll watch any one (of them) | Je regarde nimporte lesquels Any = Some adjective: partitive article Do you have any money? | As-tu de largent  ?Do you want any bread?  | Veux-tu du pain  ?Are there any survivors?  | Y a-t-il des survivants  ? pronoun: adverbial pronoun en Do you have any? | En as-tu  ?Do you want any?  | En veux-tu  ?Are there any? | Y en a-t-il  ? Any = Each and Every adjective: tout Any child can learn French | Tout enfant peut apprendre le franà §aisAny student who talks in class will be punished  | Tout à ©là ¨ve qui parle en classe sera puniAny other response would have been more appropriate  | Toute autre rà ©ponse aurait à ©tà © plus approprià ©e Not Any = None adjective: pas de or, more emphatically, the negative adjective ne... aucun He doesnt have any proof | Il na pas de preuve / Il na aucune preuveI dont have any sisters | Je nai pas de sÅ“ur / Je nai aucune sÅ“urThere isnt any excuse | Il ny a pas dexcuse / Il ny a aucune excuse pronoun: ne... pas or ne... aucun with en We dont want any | Nous nen voulons pas / Nous nen voulons aucunI dont have any | Je nen ai pas / Je nen ai aucuneThere isnt any | Il ny en a pas / Il ny en a aucune Not Any More plus maintenant or ne... plus Do you eat fish? Not any more | Tu manges du poisson  ? Plus maintenantI dont have it any more | Je ne lai plusHe wont help any more  | Il naidera plus Any = Somewhat, a Bit un peu Do you feel any happier? | Te sens-tu un peu plus heureux  ?Is he any taller? | Est-il un peu plus grand  ?Are you any more athletic than David?  | Es-tu un peu plus sportif que David  ?

Inventory Management Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words - 1

Inventory Management - Essay Example that idle stock that is held by an entity for fulfilling future transactions, then considering planes as inventory at London’s Heathrow Airport, then, the head of operations have various ways of improving the inventory flow into the airport. Reducing the time spent by the planes in the run way is such one option. Through the reduction of the time spent by individual plane on the runway, an opportunity is created to increase the number of planes landing and taking off, consequently improving the rate of passenger arrival and departure, which goes a long way in increasing the cash flow into the airport and consequently the revenues earned (Tempelmeier, 24). Scheduling planes for arrival and departure is yet another aspect of inventory management for planes, which serves to ensure that the planes does not compete for available resources such as runways or the passengers, when all of them arrives or wants to depart at the same time. Having a system, which clearly indentifies the w hereabouts of the planes, is another aspect of inventory management, which helps in communicating with the plane, reducing the chances of delays (Tempelmeier, 29). Considering the passengers as a unit of inventory, then, managing them becomes necessary to ensure there is effective arrival and departure from the airport, without having any delays or time wastage. The management of passengers as inventory requires the scheduling of arrival and departure time differently, to ensure that there is no congestion of passengers in the airport, which is likely to cause confusions and delays in clearances (Tempelmeier, 16). Designing different entry and exit routes for the passengers to and from the airport will serve to ensure that the arriving passengers and the boarding ones do not meet at any point within the airport, effectively improving the efficiency of traffic flow. Scheduling the earliest and the latest time that passengers should arrive in the airport is another aspect of inventory

Business to Business Marketing Assignment Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 3000 words - 3

Business to Business Marketing - Assignment Example Being based in Cambridge, TCL effectively meets the needs of the small and large enterprises around the town. However, as a result of the decreased revenue due to the economic downturn, some of the clients who are outside Cambridge may opt to cut on their traveling expenses. In this regard, it is essential for David and Angela to open more branches in cities such as Birmingham, Manchester, Newcastle, and Liverpool. In this way, TCL will reduce the costs incurred by its clients while traveling to Cambridge. It is also essential for the company to centralize its operations by ensuring that the Designers and Account Executives work in an established office. In this way, the company management will effectively monitor the performance of its employees. In addition, the TCL Company will emulate the culture of teamwork that is vital for the sustainable growth of any organization.  Currently, TCL adopts word-of-mouth as its primary promotion strategy. Even though this strategy has resulted in an increased number of customers, the current economic climate may negatively affect this strategy. This is based on the fact that some of the clients may lack financial ability to emulate the services offered by TCL thus making it difficult to communicate the significance of the services to other potential clients. This means that even though TCL has significantly relied on word-of-mouth in its promotion, the company should adopt social media to promote its products. In this way, it will effectively attract new customers especially those who regularly use social media during their buying process. In addition, the company should improve its website by allocating at least 15% of its revenue to ensure that it can easily communicate with its clients regardless of where they are located. It is also vital for TCL to collaborate with its clients in sponsoring social and cultural events in cities such as Bristol, Portsmouth among others. During such occasions, the company should fix ba nners that depict all the services it offers and their prices.